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Abstract
Financial markets are well known for their dramatic dynamics and consequences that affect much
of the world’s population. Consequently, much research has aimed at understanding, identifying
and forecasting crashes and rebounds in financial markets. The Johansen-Ledoit-Sornette (JLS)
model provides an operational framework to understand and diagnose financial bubbles from ra-
tional expectations and was recently extended to negative bubbles and rebounds. Using the JLS
model, we develop an alarm index based on an advanced pattern recognition method with the
aim of detecting bubbles and performing forecasts of market crashes and rebounds. Testing our
methodology on 10 major global equity markets, we show quantitatively that our developed alarm
performs much better than chance in forecasting market crashes and rebounds. We use the derived
signal to develop elementary trading strategies that produce statistically better performances than
a simple buy and hold strategy.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Hundreds of millions of people are influenced by bubbles and crashes in the financial
system. Although many academics, practitioners and policy makers have studied these
extreme events, there is little consensus yet about their causes or even definitions (see
Ref.[1] for a review of existing models and references therein). More than a decade ago,
the Johansen-Ledoit-Sornette (JLS) model [2–5] has been developed to detect bubbles and
crashes in financial markets. This model states that imitation and herding behavior of noise
traders during the bubble regime may lead to transient accelerating price growth that may
end with a possible crash. Before the crash, the price grows at a faster-than-exponential rate
rather than an exponential rate, which is normally used in other bubble models [6, 7]. This
faster-than-exponential growth is due to positive feedback in the valuation of assets among
the investors. Further consideration of tension and competition between the fundamentalists
and the noise traders leads the real prices to oscillate about this growth rate with increasing
frequency. This oscillation is actually periodic in the logarithm of time before the most
likely end of the bubble growth and, therefore, the model describes log-periodic power law
(LPPL) behavior.
Since positive feedback mechanisms in the markets may also lead to transient periods of
accelerating decrease in price, followed in turn by rapid reversals, the JLS model was recently
extended to study “negative bubbles” and rebounds [8, 9]. There, it was shown that, given
the existence of extended crashes and rebounds, negative bubbles could be identified and
their endings forecast in the same spirit as for “traditional” bubbles such as the 2006-2008 oil
bubble [10], the Chinese index bubble in 2009 [11], the real estate market in Las Vegas [12],
the U.K. and U.S. real estate bubbles [13, 14], the Nikkei index anti-bubble in 1990-1998
[15], the S&P 500 index anti-bubble in 2000-2003 [16], the Dow Jones Industrial Average
historical bubbles [17], the corporate bond spreads [18], the Polish stock market bubble [19],
the western stock markets [20], the Brazilian real (R$) - US dollar (USD) exchange rate
[21], the 2000-2010 world major stock indices [22], the South African stock market bubble
[23] and the US repurchase agreements market [24]. Moreover, new experiments in ex-ante
bubble detection and forecast were recently launched in the Financial Crisis Observatory at
ETH Zurich [25–27].
To test this idea and to implement a systematic forecast procedure based on the JLS
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model, Sornette and Zhou adapted a pattern recognition method to detect bubbles and
crashes [28]. This method was originally developed by mathematician I. M. Gelfand and his
collaborators in the mid-1970’s as an earthquake prediction scheme. Since then, this method
has been widely used in many kinds of predictions, ranging from uranium prospecting [29]
to unemployment rates [30]. Yan, Woodard and Sornette [8, 9] extended this method to
negative bubbles and rebounds of financial markets. They also improved the method in [28]
by separating the learning period and prediction period to enable a pure causal prediction.
Since the study [8, 9] only tested for rebounds in one major index (S&P 500), in this
paper, we expand to ten major global equity markets using the pattern recognition method
to detect and forecast crashes and rebounds. Our results indicate that the performance of
the predictions on both crashes and rebounds for most of the indices is better than chance.
That is, the end of large drawups and drawdowns and the subsequent crashes and rebounds
can be successfully forecast. To demonstrate this, we design a simple trading strategy and
show that it out-performs a simple buy-and-hold benchmark.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section II, we briefly introduce the JLS
model and the bubble/negative bubble versions of the model. Then, we present the pattern
recognition method for the prediction of crashes and rebounds in Section III. The quality of
the prediction is tested in Section IV using error diagrams to compare missed events versus
total alarm time. We next introduce the trading strategy based on the alarm index and test
its performance in Section V. We summarize our results and conclude in Section VI.
II. THE JLS MODEL FOR DETECTING BUBBLES AND NEGATIVE BUBBLES
The JLS model [2–5] is an extension of the rational expectation bubble model of Blanchard
and Watson [31]. In this model, a financial bubble (negative bubble) is modeled as a regime
of super-exponential power law growth (decline) punctuated by short-lived corrections or-
ganized according to the symmetry of discrete scale invariance [32]. The super-exponential
power law is argued to result from positive feedback resulting from noise trader decisions
that tend to enhance deviations from fundamental valuation in an accelerating spiral. That
is, the price of a stock goes higher (lower) than the fundamental value during the bubble
(negative bubble) period, ending in a sudden regime change.
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In the JLS model, the dynamics of asset prices is described as
dp
p
= µ(t)dt+ σ(t)dW − κdj , (1)
where p is the stock market price, µ is the drift (or trend) and dW is the increment of a
Wiener process (with zero mean and unit variance). The term dj represents a discontinuous
jump such that dj = 0 before the crash or rebound and dj = 1 after the crash or rebound
occurs. The change amplitude associated with the occurrence of a jump is determined by κ.
The parameter κ is positive for bubbles and negative for negative bubbles. The assumption
of a constant jump size is easily relaxed by considering a distribution of jump sizes, with the
condition that its first moment exists. Then, the no-arbitrage condition is expressed similarly
with κ replaced by the mean of the distribution. Each successive crash corresponds to a
jump of dj by one unit. The dynamics of the jumps is governed by a hazard rate h(t).
For the bubble (negative bubble) regime, h(t)dt is the probability that the crash (rebound)
occurs between t and t + dt conditional on the fact that it has not yet happened. We have
Et[dj] = 1× h(t)dt+ 0× (1− h(t)dt) and therefore
Et[dj] = h(t)dt . (2)
Under the assumption of the JLS model, noise traders exhibit collective herding behaviors
that may destabilize the market. The JLS model assumes that the aggregate effect of noise
traders should have a discrete scale invariant property [5, 32]. Therefore, it can be accounted
for by the following dynamics of the hazard rate
h(t) = B′(tc − t)m−1 + C ′(tc − t)m−1 cos(ω ln(tc − t)− φ′) . (3)
The no-arbitrage condition reads Et[dp] = 0, where the expectation is performed with
respect to the risk-neutral measure and in the frame of the risk-free rate. This is the standard
condition that the price process is a martingale. Taking the expectation of expression (1)
under the filtration (or history) until time t reads
Et[dp] = µ(t)p(t)dt+ σ(t)p(t)Et[dW ]− κp(t)Et[dj] . (4)
Since Et[dW ] = 0 and Et[dj] = h(t)dt (equation (2)), together with the no-arbitrage condi-
tion Et[dp] = 0, this yields
µ(t) = κh(t) . (5)
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This result (5) expresses that the return µ(t) is controlled by the risk of the crash quantified
by its hazard rate h(t).
Now, conditioned on the fact that no crash or rebound has occurred, equation (1) is
simply
dp
p
= µ(t)dt+ σ(t)dW = κh(t)dt + σ(t)dW . (6)
Its conditional expectation leads to
Et
[
dp
p
]
= κh(t)dt . (7)
Substituting with the expression (3) for h(t) and integrating yields the so-called log-periodic
power law (LPPL) equation:
ln E[p(t)] = A+B(tc − t)m + C(tc − t)m cos(ω ln(tc − t)− φ) (8)
where B = −κB′/m and C = −κC ′/√m2 + ω2. Note that this expression (8) describes
the average price dynamics only up to the end of the bubble or negative bubble. The JLS
model does not specify what happens beyond tc. This critical tc is the termination of the
bubble/negative bubble regime and the transition time to another regime. This regime could
be a big crash/rebound or a change of the growth rate of the market. The dynamics of the
Merrill Lynch EMU (European Monetary Union) Corporates Non-Financial Index in 2009
[25] provides a vivid example of a change of regime characterized by a change of growth rate
rather than by a crash or rebound. For m < 1, the crash hazard rate accelerates up to tc but
its integral up to t, which controls the total probability for a crash (or rebound) to occur
up to t, remains finite and less than 1 for all times t ≤ tc. It is this property that makes
it rational for investors to remain invested knowing that a bubble (or negative bubble) is
developing and that a crash (or rebound) is looming. Indeed, there is still a finite probability
that no crash or rebound will occur during the lifetime of the bubble. The excess return
µ(t) = κh(t) is the remuneration in the case of a bubble (the cost in the case of a negative
bubble) that investors require (accept to pay) to remain invested in the bubbly asset, which
is exposed to a crash (rebound0 risk. The condition that the price remains finite at all time,
including tc, imposes that m > 0.
Within the JLS framework, a bubble is qualified when the hazard rate accelerates. Ac-
cording to (3), this imposes 0 < m < 1. Since, by definition, the hazard rate should be
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non-negative, an additional constraint is [33]
b ≡ −Bm− |C|
√
m2 + ω2 ≥ 0 , (9)
for bubbles and
b ≡ −Bm− |C|
√
m2 + ω2 ≤ 0 , (10)
for negative bubbles.
III. PREDICTION METHOD
We adapt the pattern recognition method of Gelfand et al. [34] to generate predictions of
crashes and rebound times in financial markets on the basis of the detection and calibration
of bubbles and negative bubbles. The prediction method used here is basically that used to
detect rebounds in [8] but we now use it to detect both crashes and rebounds at the same
time. Here we give a brief summary of the method, which is decomposed into five steps.
A. Fit the time series with the JLS model
Given a historical price time series of an index (such as the S&P 500 or the Dow Jones
Industrial Average, for example), we first divide it into different sub-windows (t1, t2) of
length dt ≡ t2 − t1 according to the following rules:
1. The earliest start time of the windows is t10. Other start times t1 are calculated using
a step size of dt1 = 50 calendar days.
2. The latest end time of the windows is t20. Other end times t2 are calculated with a
negative step size dt2 = −50 calendar days.
3. The minimum window size dtmin = 110 calendar days.
4. The maximum window size dtmax = 1500 calendar days.
For each sub-window generated by the above rules, the log of the index is fit with the
JLS equation (8). The fitting procedure is a combination of a preliminary heuristic selection
of the initial points and a local minimizing algorithm (least squares). The linear parameters
are slaved by the nonlinear parameters before fitting. Details of the fitting algorithm can
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be found in [2, 8]. We keep the best 10 parameter sets for each sub-window and use these
parameter sets as the input to the pattern recognition method.
B. Definition of crash and rebound
We refer to a crash as ‘Crh’ and to a rebound as ‘Rbd’. A day d begins a crash (rebound)
if the price on that day is the maximum (minimum) price in a window of 100 days before
and 100 days after. That is,
Crh = {d | Pd = max{Px}, ∀x ∈ [d− 100, d+ 100]} (11)
Rbd = {d | Pd = min{Px}, ∀x ∈ [d− 100, d+ 100]} (12)
where Pd is the adjusted closing price on day d. Our task is to diagnose such crashes and
rebounds in advance. We could also use other windows instead of ±100 to define a rebound.
The results are stable with respect to a change of this number because we learn from the
‘learning set’ with a certain rebound window width and then try to predict the rebounds
using the same window definition. The reference [8] shows the results for ±200-days and
±365-days type of rebounds.
C. Learning set, class, group and informative parameter
As described above, we obtain a set of parameters that best fit the model (8) for each
window. Then we select a subset of the whole set which only contains the fits of crashes
and rebounds with critical times found within the window (that is, where parameter tc
is not calculate to be beyond the window bounds). We learn the properties of historical
rebounds from this set and develop the predictions based on these properties. We call this
set the learning set. In this paper, a specific day for each index is chosen as the ‘present
time’ (for backtesting purposes). All the fit windows before that day will be used as the
learning set and all the fit windows after that will be used as the testing set, in which we will
predict future rebounds. The quality of the predictability of this method can be quantified
by studying the predicted results in the testing set using only the information found in the
learning set.
Each of the sub-windows generated by the rules in Sec. IIIA will be assigned one of two
classes and one of 14 groups. Classes indicate how close the modeled critical time tc is to a
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historical crash or rebound, where Class I indicates ‘close’ and Class II indicates ‘not close’
(‘close’ will be defined below as a parameter). Groups of windows have similar window
widths. For each fit, we create a set of six parameters: m,ω, φ and B from Eq. (8), b from
Eq. (9) and q as the residual of the fit. We will compare the probability density functions
(pdf) of these parameters among the different classes and groups. The main goal of this
technique is to identify patterns of parameter pdf’s that are different between windows with
crashes or rebounds and windows without crashes or rebounds. Given such a difference and
a new, out-of-sample window, we can probabilistically state that a given window will or will
not end in a crash or rebound.
A figure is very helpful for understanding these concepts. We show the selection of the
sub-windows and sort the fits by classes and groups in Fig. 1. Then we create the pdf’s of
each of these parameters for each fit and define informative parameters as those parameters
for which the pdf’s differ significantly according to a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. For each
informative parameter, we find the regions of the abscissa of the pdf for which the Class I
pdf (fits with tc close to an extremum) is greater than the Class II pdf. This procedure has
been performed in Fig. 2.
[Figs. 1–2 about here.]
D. Questionnaires, traits and features
Using the informative parameters and their pdf’s described above, we can generate a
questionnaire for each day of the learning or testing set. A questionnaire is a quantitative
inquiry into whether or not a set of parameters is likely to indicate a bubble or negative
bubble. Questionnaires will be used to identify bubbles (negative bubbles) which will be
followed by crashes (rebounds). In short, the length of a questionnaire tells how many
informative parameters there are for a given window size. An informative parameter implies
that the pdf’s of that parameter are very different for windows with a crash/rebound than
windows without. The more values of ‘1’ in the questionnaire, the more likely it is that the
parameters are associated with a crash/rebound.
One questionnaire is constructed for each day tscan in our learning set. We first collect
all the fits which have a critical time near that day (‘near’ will be defined). Then we create
a string of bits whose length is equal to the number of informative parameters found. Each
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bit can take a value -1, 0 or 1 (a balanced ternary system). Each bit represents the answer
to the question: are more than half of the collected fits more likely to be considered as Class
I? If the answer is ‘yes’, we assign 1 in the bit of the questionnaire corresponding to this
informative parameter. Otherwise, we assign 0 when the answer cannot be determined or
−1 when the answer is ‘no’. A visual representation of this questionnaire process is shown
in Fig. 3.
[Fig. 3 about here.]
The concept of a trait is developed to describe the property of the questionnaire for
each tscan. Each questionnaire can be decomposed into a fixed number of traits if the
length of the questionnaire is fixed. We will not give the details in how the traits are
generated in this paper. For a clear explanation of the method, please refer to Sec. 3.9 of
the reference [8]. Think of a trait as a sub-set (like the ‘important’ short section from a very
long DNA sequence) of a fixed-length questionnaire that is usually found in windows that
show crashes/rebounds. Conversely, a trait can indicate windows where a crash/rebound is
not found.
Assume that there are two sets of traits TI and TII corresponding to Class I and Class
II, respectively. Scan day by day the date t before the last day of the learning set. If t is
‘near’ an extreme event (crash or rebound), then all traits generated by the questionnaire
for this date belong to TI . Otherwise, all traits generated by this questionnaire belong to
TII . ‘Near’ is defined as at most 20 days away from an extreme event. The same definition
will be used later in Section IV when we introduce the error diagram.
Using this threshold, we declare that an alarm starts on the first day that the unsorted
crash alarm index time series exceeds this threshold. The duration of this alarm Da is set
to 41 days, since the longest distance between a crash and the day with index greater than
the threshold is 20 days.
Count the frequencies of a single trait τ in TI and TII . If τ is in TI for more than α times
and in TII for less than β times, then we call this trait τ a feature FI of Class I. Similarly, if
τ is in TI for less than α times and in TII for more than β times, then we call τ a feature FII
of Class II. The pair (α, β) is defined as a feature qualification. Fig. 4 shows the generation
process of traits and features. We would like to clarify that by definition some of the traits
are not from any type of feature since they are not ‘extreme’ and we cannot extract clear
information from them.
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[Fig. 4 about here.]
E. Alarm index
The final piece in our methodology is to define an alarm index for both crashes and
rebounds. An alarm index is developed based on features to show the probability that a
certain day is considered to be a rebound or a crash. We first collect all the fits which have
a predicted critical time near this specific day and generate questionnaires and traits from
these fits. The rebound (crash) alarm index for a certain day is just a ratio quantified by
the total number of traits from feature type FI (a set of traits which have high probability
to represent rebound (crash)) divided by the total number of traits from both FI and FII .
Note that FII is a set of traits which have low probability to represent rebound (crash). The
principles for the generation of the alarm index are summarized in Fig. 5.
[Fig. 5 about here.]
Two types of alarm index are developed. One is for the back tests in the learning set, as
we have already used the information before this time to generate informative parameters
and features. The other alarm index is for the prediction tests. We generate this prediction
alarm index using only the information before a certain time and then try to predict crashes
and rebounds in the ‘future’.
IV. PREDICTION IN MAJOR EQUITY MARKETS
We perform systematic detections and forecasts on both the market crashes and rebounds
for 10 major global equity markets using the method we discussed in Sec. III. The 10 indices
are S&P 500 (US), Nasdaq composite (US), Russell 2000 (US), FTSE 100 (UK), CAC 40
(France), SMI (Switzerland), DAX (German), Nikkei 225 (Japan), Hang Seng (Hong Kong)
and ASX (Australia). The basic information for these indices used in this study is listed in
Tab. I. Due to space constraints, we cannot show all results for these 10 indices here. The
complete results for three indices from different continents are shown in this paper. They
are Russell 2000 (America), SMI (Europe) and Nikkei 225 (Asia). Partial results for the
remaining indices are shown in Tab. II, which will be discussed in details later in Sec. V.
The alarm index depends on the features which are generated using information from
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the learning set. Thus, the alarm index before the end of the learning set uses ‘future’
information. That is, the value of the alarm index on a certain day t0 in the learning set
uses prices found at t > t0 to generate features. The feature definitions from the learning
set are then used to define the alarm index in the testing set using only past prices. That
is, the value of the alarm index on a certain day t0 in the testing set uses only prices found
at t ≤ t0 in the testing set (and the definitions of features found in the learning set). We do
not use ‘future’ information in the testing set. In this case, the alarm index predicts crashes
and rebounds in the market.
The crash and the rebound alarm index for Russell 2000, SMI and Nikkei are shown in
Figs. 6–11. Figs. 6–8 show the back testing results for these three indices and Figs. 9–11
present the prediction results. In all of these results, the feature qualification pair (7, 100)
is used. This means that a certain trait must appear in trait Class I (crash or rebound) at
least 7 times and must appear in trait Class II (no crash or rebound) less than 100 times. If
so, then we say that this trait is a feature of Class I. If, on the other hand, the trait appears
7 times or less in Class I or appears 100 times or more in Class II, then this trait is a
feature of Class II. Tests on other feature qualification pairs are performed also. Due to the
space constraints, we do not show the alarm index constructed by other feature qualification
pairs here, but later we will present the predictability of these alarm indices by showing the
corresponding error diagrams. In the rest of this paper, if we do not mention otherwise, we
use (7, 100) as the feature qualification pair.
[Figs. 6–11 about here.]
To check the quality of the alarm index quantitatively, we introduce error diagrams
[35, 36]. Using Nikkei 225 as an example, we create an error diagram for crash predictions
after 17-Apr-1999 with a certain feature qualification in the following way:
1. Calculate features and define the alarm index using the learning set between 04-Jan-
1984 and 17-Apr-1999.
2. Count the number of crashes after 17-Apr-1999 as defined in Sec. III B and expression
(11). There are 7 crashes.
3. Take the crash alarm index time series (after 17-Apr-1999) and sort the set of all alarm
index values in decreasing order. There are 4,141 points in this series and the sorting
operation delivers a list of 4,141 index values, from the largest to the smallest one.
11
4. The largest value of this sorted series defines the first threshold.
5. Using this threshold, we declare that an alarm starts on the first day that the unsorted
crash alarm index time series exceeds this threshold. The duration of this alarm Da
is set to 41 days, since the longest distance between a crash and the day with index
greater than the threshold is 20 days. This threshold is consistent with the previous
classification of questionnaires in Section IIID, where we define a predicted critical
time as ‘near’ the real extreme events when its distance is less than 20 days. Then, a
prediction is deemed successful when a crash falls inside that window of 41 days.
6. If there are no successful predictions at this threshold, move the threshold down to
the next value in the sorted series of alarm index.
7. Once a crash is predicted with a new value of the threshold, count the ratio of un-
predicted crashes (unpredicted crashes / total crashes in set) and the ratio of alarms
used (duration of alarm period / 4,141 prediction days). Mark this as a single point
in the error diagram.
In this way, we will mark 7 points in the error diagram for the 7 Nikkei 225 crashes after
17-Apr-1999.
The aim of using such an error diagram in general is to show that a given prediction
scheme performs better than random. A random prediction follows the line y = 1 − x in
the error diagram. A set of points below this line indicates that the prediction is better
than randomly choosing alarms. The prediction is seen to improve as more error diagram
points are found near the origin point (0, 0). The advantage of error diagrams is to avoid dis-
cussing how different observers would rate the quality of predictions in terms of the relative
importance of avoiding the occurrence of false positive alarms and of false negative missed
rebounds. By presenting the full error diagram, we thus sample all possible preferences and
the unique criterion is that the error diagram curve be shown to be statistically significantly
below the anti-diagonal y = 1− x.
In Figs. 12–14, we show the results on predictions and back tests in terms of error diagrams
for crashes and rebounds in each of the indices. The results for different feature qualification
pairs (α, β) are shown in each figure. All these figures show that our alarm index for crashes
and rebounds in either back testing or prediction performs much better than random.
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[Figs. 12–14 about here.]
V. TRADING STRATEGY
One of the most powerful methods to test the predictability of a signal is to design
simple trading strategies based on it. We do so with our alarm index by using simple
moving average strategies, which keep all the key features of the alarm index and avoid
parametrization problems. The strategies are kept as simple as possible and can be applied
to any indices.
The trading strategies are designed as follows: the daily exposure of our strategy θ is
determined by the average value of the alarm index for the past n days. The rest of our
wealth, 1− θ, is invested in a 3-month US treasury bill.
Let us denote the average rebound and crash alarm index of the past n days as AIR and
AIC respectively. We create three different strategies:
• A long strategy using only the rebound alarm index. We will take a long position in
this strategy only. The daily exposure of our strategy is based on the average value of
the past n days rebound alarm index: θ = AIR.
• A short strategy using only the crash alarm index. We will take a short position in
this strategy only. The daily absolute exposure of our strategy is based on the average
value of the past n days crash alarm index: |θ| = AIC .
• A long-short strategy linearly combining both strategies above. When the average
rebound alarm index is higher than the average crash alarm index, we take a long
position and vice versa. The absolute exposure |θ| = |AIR − AIC |.
These strategies have the advantage of having few parameters, as only the duration n
needs to be determined. Despite their simplicity, they capture the two key features of the
alarm index. First, we see that the alarms are clustered around certain dates. The more
clustering seen, the more likely that a change of regime is coming and, therefore, the more
we should be invested. Second, we see that a strong alarm close to 1 should be treated as
more important than a weaker alarm while at the same time the smaller alarms still contain
some information and should not be discarded.
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Tab. II summarizes the Sharpe ratios for long-short strategies on the out-of-sample period
(testing set) for each index. The strategy is calculated with four different moving average
look-backs: n = 20, 30, 40, 60 days. We use the Sharpe ratios of the market during this
period as the benchmark in this table. Recall that the Sharpe ratio is a measure of the
excess return (or risk premium) per unit of risk in an investment asset or a trading strategy.
It is defined as:
S =
R− Rf
σ
=
R− Rf√
V ar[R −Rf ]
, (13)
where R is the return of the strategy and Rf is the risk free rate. We use the US three-
month treasury bill rate here as the risk free rate. The Sharpe ratio is used to characterize
how well the return of an asset compensates the investor for the risk taken: the higher
the Sharpe ratio number, the better. When comparing two assets with the same expected
return against the same risk free rate, the asset with the higher Sharpe ratio gives more
return for the same risk. Therefore, investors are often advised to pick investments with
high Sharpe ratios. From Tab. II, we can find that, for seven out of ten global major
indices, the Sharpe ratios of our strategies (no matter which look-back duration n is chosen)
are much higher than the market, which means that our strategies perform better than the
simple buy and hold strategy. This result indicates that the JLS model combined with the
pattern recognition method has a statistically significant power in systematic detection of
rebounds and of crashes in financial markets.
[Tab. II about here.]
The long-short strategies for CAC 40, DAX and ASX perform not as well as the market.
However, this is not a statement against the prediction power of our method, but instead
supports the evidence that our method detects specific signatures preceding rebounds and
crashes that are essentially different from high volatility indicators. Contrary to common
lore and to some exceptional empirical cases [37, 38], crashes of the financial markets of-
ten happen during low-volatility periods and terminate them. By construction, both our
rebound alarm index and the crash alarm index are high during such volatile periods. So
if the alarm indices of both types are high at the same time, it is likely that the market
is experiencing a highly volatile period. Now, we can refine the strategy and combine the
evidence of a directional crash or rebound, together with a high volatility indicator. If we
interpret the two co-existing evidences as a signal for a crash, we should ignore these re-
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bound alarm index and take the short strategy mentioned before. As an application, we
show the wealth trajectories of DAX based on different type of strategies in Fig. 15. In the
beginning of 2008, both the rebound alarm index and the crash alarm index for DAX are
very high, therefore, we detect this period as a highly volatile period and ignore the rebound
alarm index. The short strategy gives a very high Sharpe ratio S = 0.41 compared to the
long-short and short benchmarks where S = 0.06. The strategy’s average weight is used to
compute these benchmarks. These simple benchmarks are constantly invested by a given
percentage in the market so that, over the whole time period, they give the same exposure
as the corresponding strategy being tested but without the genuine timing information the
strategy should contain.
[Figs. 15 about here.]
As before, the detailed out-of-sample performances for each sample index (Russell 2000,
SMI and Nikkei 225) are also tested. Fig. 16–18 illustrate the wealth trajectories for different
strategies. In order to show the consistency of the strategies with respect to the chosen
parameters in the pattern recognition method, we show the performance of the Russell 2000
index for different qualification pairs: (15, 100) for rebounds and (10, 100) for crashes. From
these wealth trajectories, it is very obvious that our alarm indices can catch the market
rebounds and crashes efficiently.
[Figs. 16–18 about here.]
The detailed performances for these three stock indices are listed in Tabs. III–VI. We
also provide the performance of the Russell 2000 index for the ‘normal’ qualification pair:
(7, 100) in Tab. IV as a reference. These tables confirm again that strategies mostly succeed
in capturing big changes of regime. Compared to the market, the strategies based on our
alarm index perform better than the market for more than eleven years in all the impor-
tant measures: Annual returns and Sharpe ratios are larger, while volatilities, downside
deviations and maximum drawdowns are smaller than the market performance.
[Tabs. III–VI about here.]
VI. CONCLUSION
We provided a systematic method to detect financial crashes and rebounds. The method
is a combination of the JLS model for bubbles and negative bubbles, and the pattern recogni-
15
tion technique originally developed for earthquake predictions. The outcome of this method
is a rebound/crash alarm index to indicate the probability of a rebound/crash for a certain
time. The predictability of the alarm index has been tested by 10 major global stock indices.
The performance is checked quantitatively by error diagrams and trading strategies. All the
results from error diagrams indicate that our method in detecting crashes and rebounds per-
forms better than chance and confirm that the new method is very powerful and robust in
the prediction of crashes and rebounds in financial markets. Our long-short trading strate-
gies based on the crash and rebound alarm index perform better than the benchmarks (buy
and hold strategy with the same exposure as the average exposure of our strategies) in seven
out of ten indices. Highly volatile periods are observed in the indices of which the long-short
trading strategy fails to surpass the benchmark. By construction of the alarm index and
the fact that highly volatile periods are not coherent with bullish markets, we claim that
we should ignore the rebound alarm index during such volatile periods. This statement
has been proved by the short strategy which only consider the crash alarm index. Thus,
our trading strategies confirm again that the alarm index has a strong ability in detecting
rebounds and crashes in the financial markets.
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Index name Yahoo ticker Learning start Prediction start Prediction end win. #
S&P 500 ˆGSPC 5-Jan-1950 26-Mar-1999 3-Jun-2009 11662
Nasdaq ˆIXIC 13-Dec-1971 20-Mar-1999 30-Jul-2010 7209
Russell 2000 ˆRUT 30-Sep-1987 17-Apr-1999 27-Aug-2010 4270
FTSE 100 ˆFTSE 3-May-1984 17-Apr-1999 27-Aug-2010 4970
CAC 40 ˆFCHI 1-Mar-1990 17-Apr-1999 27-Aug-2010 3766
SMI ˆSSMI 9-Nov-1990 17-Apr-1999 27-Aug-2010 3626
DAX ˆGDAXI 26-Nov-1990 17-Apr-1999 27-Aug-2010 3626
Nikkei 225 ˆN225 4-Jan-1984 17-Apr-1999 27-Aug-2010 5026
Hang Seng ˆHSI 31-Dec-1986 17-Apr-1999 27-Aug-2010 4410
ASX ˆAORD 6-Aug-1984 17-Apr-1999 27-Aug-2010 4914
TABLE I: Information for the tested indices: Yahoo ticker of each index, starting time of
learning and prediction periods, ending time of prediction and number of sub-windows.
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Index Strategy (duration n) Market
20 30 40 60
S&P 500 0.32 0.38 0.43 0.39 -0.28
Nasdaq 0.18 0.41 0.48 0.34 -0.11
Russell 2000 0.29 0.3 0.27 0.27 0.03
FTSE 100 -0.07 -0.06 0.01 0.05 -0.22
CAC 40 -0.18 -0.35 -0.37 -0.24 -0.19
SMI 0.28 0.22 0.14 0.13 -0.20
DAX -0.26 -0.24 -0.27 -0.19 -0.06
Nikkei 225 0.07 0.19 0.39 0.59 -0.33
Hang Seng 0.32 0.38 0.31 0.23 0.06
ASX -0.38 -0.41 -0.33 -0.24 0.02
TABLE II: Summary of Sharpe ratios for the market and the long-short strategies
with different moving average duration n. The start and end dates of the strategies are
26-Mar-1999 – 3-Jun-2009 for S&P 500, 20-Mar-1999 – 30-Jul-2010 for Nasdaq and 17-Apr-1999
– 27-Aug-2010 for others. The feature qualification pairs of (7, 100) for both crash and rebound
alarm indices are used in this calculation.
Strategy (duration n) Market
20 30 40 60
Ann Ret 5.3% 5.4% 4.8% 4.2% 0.1%
Vol 6.4% 5.9% 5.3% 4.1% 26.3%
Downside dev 4.2% 3.6% 3.4% 2.7% 18.9%
Sharpe 0.42 0.47 0.41 0.37 0.03
Max DD 10% 7% 7% 6% 65%
Abs Expo 16% 15% 14% 12%
Ann turnover 328% 220% 167% 123%
TABLE III: Russell 2000 index long-short strategies out-of-sample performance table.
Start date: 17-Apr-1999, end date 27-Aug-2010. Qualification pairs: (15, 100) for rebounds and
(10, 100) for crashes.
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Strategy (duration n) Market
20 30 40 60
Ann Ret 4.8% 4.7% 4.3% 4.0% 0.1%
Vol 7.9% 7.1% 6.5% 5.2% 26.3%
Downside dev 5.4% 4.8% 4.5% 3.6% 18.9%
Sharpe 0.29 0.30 0.27 0.27 0.03
Max DD 11% 12% 9% 9% 65%
Abs Expo 23% 21% 20% 18%
Ann turnover 446% 306% 237% 172%
TABLE IV: Russell 2000 index long-short strategies out-of-sample performance table.
Start date: 17-Apr-1999, end date 27-Aug-2010. Qualification pairs: (7, 100) for both rebounds
and crashes.
Strategy (duration n) Market
20 30 40 60
Ann Ret 3.4% 3.3% 3.0% 3.0% -3.4%
Vol 2.6% 2.6% 2.5% 2.3% 20.4%
Downside dev 1.7% 1.6% 1.6% 1.5% 14.6%
Sharpe 0.28 0.22 0.14 0.13 -0.20
Max DD 7% 6% 7% 5% 59%
Abs Expo 9% 9% 9% 9%
Ann turnover 134% 102% 77% 55%
TABLE V: SMI index long-short strategies out-of-sample performance table. Start date
17-Apr-1999, end date 27-Aug-2010.
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Strategy (duration n) Market
20 30 40 60
Ann Ret 3.0% 3.7% 4.8% 5.7% -8.4%
Vol 6.3% 6.0% 5.6% 5.0% 25.4%
Downside dev 4.4% 4.1% 3.7% 3.2% 18.7%
Sharpe 0.07 0.19 0.39 0.59 -0.33
Max DD 15% 13% 10% 8% 75%
Abs Expo 19% 18% 17% 16%
Ann turnover 417% 300% 223% 146%
TABLE VI: Nikkei 225 index long-short strategies out-of-sample performance table.
Start date 17-Apr-1999, end date 27-Aug-2010.
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FIG. 1: Step one of pattern recognition procedure: Create sub-windows, fit each window
with the JLS model. Classify the fits in groups and classes.
FIG. 2: Step two of pattern recognition procedure: For each group compare fits in class I
with those in class II and find out the informative parameters.
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FIG. 3: Step three of pattern recognition procedure: Generate the questionnaire for each
trading day.
FIG. 4: Step four of pattern recognition procedure: Create traits from questionnaires.
Obtain features for each class by traits statistics.
25
FIG. 5: Step five of pattern recognition procedure: Construct the alarm index for each day
by decomposing the questionnaire into traits for that day and compare these traits to the features
of each class.
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FIG. 6: Alarm index and log-price of the Russell 2000 Index for the learning set, where
the end date is 17-Apr-1999. (upper) Rebound alarm index for the learning set using feature
qualification pair (7, 100). The rebound alarm index is in the range [0, 1]. The higher the rebound
alarm index, the more likely is the occurrence of a rebound. (middle) Crash alarm index for the
learning set using feature qualification pair (7, 100). The crash alarm index is in the range [0, 1].
The higher the crash alarm index, the more likely is the occurrence of a crash. (lower) Plot of price
versus time of Russell Index (shown in blue cycles). Green solid vertical lines indicate rebounds
defined by local minima within plus and minus 100 days around them. Red dashed vertical lines
indicate crashes defined by local maxima within plus and minus 100 days around them. Note that
these rebounds and crashes are the historical “change of regime” rather than only the jump-like
reversals.
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FIG. 7: Alarm index and price of the SMI Index for the learning set, where the end date
is 17-Apr-1999. The format is the same as Fig. 6.
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FIG. 8: Alarm index and price of the Nikkei 225 Index for the learning set, where the
end date is 17-Apr-1999. The format is the same as Fig. 6.
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FIG. 9: Alarm index and log-price of Russell 2000 Index for the predicting set after
17-Apr-1999. The format is the same as Fig. 6.
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FIG. 10: Alarm index and price of the SMI Index for the predicting set after 17-Apr-1999.
The format is the same as Fig. 6.
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FIG. 11: Alarm index and price of the Nikkei 225 Index for the predicting set after
17-Apr-1999. The format is the same as Fig. 6.
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FIG. 12: Error diagram for back tests and predictions of crashes and rebounds for
Russell 2000 index with different types of feature qualifications. The value of the feature
qualifications are shown in the legend. The fact that all the curves lie under the line y = 1 − x
indicates better performance than chance in detecting crashes and rebounds using our method.
(Upper left) Back tests of crashes. (Upper right) Back tests of rebounds. (Lower left) Predictions
of crashes. (Lower right) Predictions of rebounds. Feature qualification (α, β) means that, if the
occurrence of a certain trait in Class I is larger than α and less than β, then we call this trait a
feature of Class I and vice versa. See text for more information.
31
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Alarm period / Total period
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Fr
ac
tio
n 
of
 e
ve
nt
s 
no
t p
re
di
ct
ed
(5,75)
(7,100)
(10,100)
(15,100)
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Alarm period / Total period
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Fr
ac
tio
n 
of
 e
ve
nt
s 
no
t p
re
di
ct
ed
(5,75)
(7,100)
(10,100)
(15,100)
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Alarm period / Total period
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Fr
ac
tio
n 
of
 e
ve
nt
s 
no
t p
re
di
ct
ed
(5,75)
(7,100)
(10,100)
(15,100)
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Alarm period / Total period
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Fr
ac
tio
n 
of
 e
ve
nt
s 
no
t p
re
di
ct
ed
(5,75)
(7,100)
(10,100)
(15,100)
FIG. 13: Error diagram for back tests and predictions of crashes and rebounds for SMI
index with different types of feature qualifications. The format is the same as Fig. 12.
32
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Alarm period / Total period
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Fr
ac
tio
n 
of
 e
ve
nt
s 
no
t p
re
di
ct
ed
(5,75)
(7,100)
(10,100)
(15,100)
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Alarm period / Total period
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Fr
ac
tio
n 
of
 e
ve
nt
s 
no
t p
re
di
ct
ed
(5,75)
(7,100)
(10,100)
(15,100)
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Alarm period / Total period
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Fr
ac
tio
n 
of
 e
ve
nt
s 
no
t p
re
di
ct
ed
(5,75)
(7,100)
(10,100)
(15,100)
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Alarm period / Total period
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Fr
ac
tio
n 
of
 e
ve
nt
s 
no
t p
re
di
ct
ed
(5,75)
(7,100)
(10,100)
(15,100)
FIG. 14: Error diagram for back tests and predictions of crashes and rebounds for
Nikkei 225 index with different types of feature qualifications. The format is the same as
Fig. 12.
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FIG. 15: Performance of trading strategy using our technique: DAX index 60 days
moving average strategy using the feature qualification pair (15, 100) for crashes and
(10, 200) for rebounds. (upper) the exposures for different strategies, where the olive solid line
represents the long-short strategy, the green dotted line and red dashed line are for long and short
strategy respectively. (Lower) The historical price and wealth trajectories of the strategies. The
blue circles represent the historical price of the index while the others are the wealth trajectories
consistent with the upper figure (olive solid - long-short, green dotted - long, red dashed - short).
The Sharpe ratio for the strategies are 0.07 (long-short), −0.66 (long) and 0.41 (short). The
Sharpe ratio of the corresponding benchmarks, which consist of constant position in the market
with exposure equal to the strategy over the whole period, are 0.06 (long-short), −0.06 (long) and
0.06 (short). And the Sharpe ratio of the index in this period is −0.06. Note that the short strategy
performs better than long-short or long strategies as discussed in the text.
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FIG. 16: Performance of trading strategy using our technique: Russell 2000 index 30
days moving average strategy using the feature qualification pair (15, 100) for crashes
and (10, 100) for rebounds. The format is the same as Fig. 15.
The Sharpe ratio for the strategies are 0.47 (long-short), 0.18 (long) and 0.26 (short). The Sharpe
ratio of the corresponding benchmarks, which consist of constant position in the market with
exposure equal to the strategy over the whole period, are 0.03 (long-short), 0.03 (long) and −0.03
(short). And the Sharpe ratio of the index in this period is 0.03.
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FIG. 17: Performance of trading strategy using our technique: SMI index 20 days
moving average strategy. The format is the same as Fig. 15.
The Sharpe ratio for the strategies are 0.28 (long-short), −0.04 (long) and 0.65 (short). The
Sharpe ratio of the corresponding benchmarks, which consist of constant position in the market
with exposure equal to the strategy over the whole period, are 0.2 (long-short), −0.2 (long) and
0.2 (short). And the Sharpe ratio of the index in this period is −0.2.
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FIG. 18: Performance of trading strategy using our technique: Nikkei 225 index 60
days moving average strategy. The format is the same as Fig. 15.
The Sharpe ratio for the strategies are 0.59 (long-short), −0.11 (long) and 0.59 (short). The
Sharpe ratio of the corresponding benchmarks, which consist of constant position in the market
with exposure equal to the strategy over the whole period, are 0.33 (long-short), −0.33 (long) and
0.33 (short). And the Sharpe ratio of the index in this period is −0.33.
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